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Abstract 
There is currently no uniform social security dispute resolution 
system in South Africa due to the piecemeal fashion in which 
schemes were established or protection against individual risks 
regulated. The result is that each statute provides for its own 
dispute resolution institution(s) and processes. There are also 
various gaps and challenges in the current social security 
dispute resolution systems, some of these relating to the 
uncoordinated and fragmented nature of the system; 
inaccessibility of some social security institutions; 
inappropriateness of some current appeal institutions; the lack 
of a systematic approach in establishing appeal institutions; a 
limited scope of jurisdiction and powers of adjudication 
institutions; inconsistencies in review and/or appeal provisions 
in various laws; an unavailability of alternative dispute 
resolution procedures; and an absence of institutional 
independence of adjudication institutions or forums. The system 
is therefore in need of reform. In developing an appropriate 
system, much can be learned from innovative experiences in 
comparative South African non-social security jurisdictions on 
the establishment of effective and efficient dispute resolution 
frameworks. Dispute resolution systems in the labour relations, 
business competition regulation and consumer protection 
jurisdictions have been established to realise the constitutional 
rights of their users (especially the rights of access to justice, to 
a fair trial and to just administrative action). They thus provide a 
benchmark for the development of the South African social 
security dispute resolution system. 
Keywords 
Access to justice; social security; adjudication; dispute 
resolution; review; reconsideration; appeal; hearing; jurisdiction; 
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1 Introduction 
The South African social security adjudication system is in dire need of 
reform. This is due to the various challenges bedevilling it. In reforming the 
adjudication system, much can be learned from innovative experiences in 
comparative jurisdictions on the establishment of effective and efficient 
dispute resolution frameworks. This article seeks to analyse the dispute 
resolution systems in some key comparative South African jurisdictions. 
Selected dispute resolution systems investigated are the labour relations 
system;1 the business competition regulation jurisdiction;2 and the 
consumer protection jurisdiction.3 The institutions, mechanisms and 
procedures in these jurisdictions, established to resolve disputes that may 
arise, are reviewed to provide a possible benchmark for comparison with 
the current social security dispute resolution framework. 
These institutions and their procedures have been established to realise 
the constitutional rights of their users (especially the rights of access to 
justice and to a fair trial). They therefore seek to comply with the 
constitutional requirements of the rights. They are thus examined to 
ascertain their effectiveness in providing access to justice for their users. 
Such mechanisms and procedures could provide guidelines for the 
development of the social security dispute resolution system. 
2 Right of access to justice and related rights 
The South African social security adjudication system seeks to realise 
mainly the constitutional rights of access to courts and to social security.4 
In addition, since some aspects of social security are administered by 
public administrative institutions, they are bound to comply with the right to 
just administrative action. This implies that the social security dispute 
                                            
* MAT Nyenti. LLD (UNISA); LLM (UJ); LLB (Hons) Buea (Cameroon). Senior 
Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Johannesburg. Email: mnyenti@uj.ac.za. 
1 This consists of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), 
the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court established by the Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995 (LRA). 
2 Involving the Competition Commission, the Competition Tribunal and the 
Competition Appeal Court established in terms of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
3 Made up of the National Credit Regulator and the National Consumer Tribunal 
established in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
4 Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states that 
"everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application 
of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another 
independent and impartial tribunal or forum". S 27(1)(c) of the Constitution states 
that "everyone has the right to have access to social security, including, if they are 
unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance".  
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resolution system must fully give effect to these rights as required by the 
Constitution; as well as to other rights having a bearing on these two rights 
(such as the rights to equality and human dignity). 
Section 34 of the Constitution seeks to ensure access to the institutions 
and mechanisms to resolve disputes. The right has three components.5 In 
the first instance, it guarantees everyone who has a dispute the right to be 
able to bring that dispute to a court or tribunal to seek redress (the right to 
access to justice). This ensures protection against actions by the State 
and other persons which deny access to courts and other forums; and the 
elimination of obstacles in the way of access to courts. It requires that 
accessibility to the adjudication institutions must be ensured, meaning that 
everyone who has a dispute must be able to bring a dispute to a court or 
tribunal to seek redress.6 Accessibility is promoted through aspects such 
as the geographic or physical location of an institution; the absence of 
procedural hurdles in the submission of disputes;7 the hearing venues and 
modalities; the education of claimants on the available avenues for 
redress;8 the language(s) utilised during proceedings; the friendliness of 
                                            
5 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 704. 
6 See Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook; DOJ&CD HIV/AIDS, Human 
Rights and Access to Justice 11-12; Vawda 2005 Obiter; Foundation for Human 
Rights Civil Society Priorities; Anderson Access to Justice and Legal Process 19-20; 
Nyenti 2012 Obiter; S v Makwanyane1995 3 SA 391 (CC); and Mohlomi v Minister of 
Defence 1997 1 SA 124 (CC).  
7 Access to courts involves a process of enabling and empowering those not enjoying 
rights to claim those rights, which includes eliminating any procedural hurdles that 
prevent the free exercise of those rights (see Vawda 2005 Obiter 239-240). 
Therefore, even where a social security adjudication system is accessible in other 
aspects, it will still be ineffective if (potential) users are restricted from the system 
due to insurmountable procedural hurdles. Procedural rules give content to 
substantive rights, and must enable the effective realisation of the rights. It has been 
declared that "a substantive right on paper is of no use unless it is harnessed to an 
effective procedural remedy which allows the litigant to actually bring the case before 
the court in good time and without excessive cost. Legal gateways are important 
determinants of what kind of justice can be achieved. ... Legal procedures not only 
determine whether the poor can get access to legal remedies, and how quickly and 
effective such remedies will be, they can also influence the way that a particular 
dispute is construed by the law, and the kinds of outcomes which are possible" 
(Anderson Access to Justice and Legal Process 15). 
8 For a person to be able to approach a court or tribunal to seek redress, he or she 
must have knowledge of his or her rights. Therefore, knowledge of rights is a 
prerequisite to access to justice. However, many South Africans have little 
knowledge of the law and human rights (see Mubangizi 2004 JJS). It has been held 
that the right to access to justice in terms of the Constitution includes the ability to 
achieve this, which implies (inter alia) that a prospective litigant must have 
knowledge of the applicable law; must be able to identify that she or he may be able 
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the prescribed documents and forms; the diversity of the dispute 
lodgement options; the reasonableness of the timeframes for lodging 
disputes; and the provision of financial and other support. 
Secondly, the right further requires that courts, tribunals or forums that 
resolve disputes must be independent and impartial in the execution of 
their duties. For the adjudication institution to be effective it must be able 
to provide claimants with appropriate redress. For an adjudication 
institution to be able to do this, it must be able to decide disputes 
according to the facts and the law, including freedom from improper 
influence (both internal and external).9 This means that to be effective, an 
adjudication institution must be independent and impartial. 
In order to ensure access to justice, section 34 requires disputes to be 
decided in a fair public hearing.10 In De Beer v North-Central Local Council 
and South-Central Local Council the court stated that the hearing itself 
must also be fair.11 Section 34 also requires that an alternative tribunal or 
forum must also conduct proceedings in a fair public hearing.12 However, 
the proceedings need not be identical to those of a court of law,13 as the 
requirements of fairness in terms of section 34 are flexible and depend on 
different factors. In addition, it would neither be unfair nor unconstitutional 
for a tribunal or forum to adopt procedures different from those of a 
court.14 
The resolution of disputes must also be undertaken in a fair manner. 
Embedded in the right to a fair trial is also the right to procedural equality. 
This means that adjudication institutions should ensure that claimants 
have reasonable opportunities to assert or defend their rights.15 
                                                                                                                       
to obtain a remedy from a court; and must have some knowledge about what to do in 
order to achieve access (see Budlender "Access to Courts" 344). 
9 See ILO Social Security and the Rule of Law para 433. 
10 Currie and de Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 723. 
11 De Beer v North-Central Local Council and South-Central Local Council 2002 1 SA 
429 (CC) para 14. 
12 Currie and de Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 723. 
13 See Mbebe v Chairman, White Commission 2000 7 BCLR 754 (Tk) para 776. 
14 See Bongoza v Minister of Correctional Services 2002 6 SA 330 (TkH) paras 22-25. 
Also see Brickhill and Friedman "Access to Courts" 59-97, 59-98. 
15 It implies, among other things, that reasonable notice of the time when the dispute is 
to be decided should be given to a person concerned (with the adjudication 
institution given the power to condone a failure to comply with any notice 
requirements); power to determine the appropriate procedures; personal appearance 
and appropriate representation (each party to a dispute should be able to participate 
in the adjudication of the dispute. Each party should also be guaranteed the right to 
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The Constitution guarantees the right of everyone to administrative action 
that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.16 In addition, everyone 
whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has 
the right to be given written reasons.17 The State is required to enact 
national legislation to give effect to the right to administrative justice and to 
provide for the review of administrative action by a court or other 
independent and impartial tribunal.18 The Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act was adopted in realisation of this.19 
The provisions of section 33 regulate the conduct of public administration. 
They are thus relevant to the social security adjudication framework since 
dispute resolution is undertaken by public administrative institutions.20 The 
right to just administrative action and the provisions of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act also bind private institutions when they make 
decisions that adversely affect a person's rights.21 Administrative justice 
ensures that public officials act within their powers under the various social 
security statutes and that the procedures they apply are fair and the 
outcomes of their decisions are reasonable.  
                                                                                                                       
engage a lawyer or another qualified representative of their choice); equal access to 
evidence (each party should also have access to the relevant evidence, including 
documents, expert opinions, etc.); rapid resolution of disputes (disputes must be 
resolved as expeditiously as possible, especially social security disputes); 
inexpensive adjudication procedures (procedures should be free or costs should be 
kept at the absolute minimum so as to allow even the poor to be able to resolve 
disputes); and the guarantee of an effective remedy (the adjudication institution 
should be able to make a decision that has to be duly motivated or, in other words, 
explain the reasoning that led to the decision in the dispute, and be legally 
enforceable) (see ILO Social Security and the Rule of Law para 433; Budlender 
"Access to Courts"; Dugard 2008 SAJHR; De Beer v North-Central Local Council 
and South-Central Local Council 2002 1 SA 429 (CC); Bangindawo v Head of the 
Nyanda Regional Authority 1998 3 BCLR 314 (Tk) 331D; and Beinash v Ernst and 
Young 1999 2 SA 91 (CC). 
16 Section 33(1) of the Constitution. 
17 Section 33(2) of the Constitution. 
18 Section 33(3) of the Constitution. 
19 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
20 See President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 
2000 1 SA 1 (CC); and Chirwa v Transnet Limited 2008 4 SA 367 (CC) which laid 
down a "functions test" in determining whether an institution is performing a public 
function. 
21  De Villiers 2002 SAJHR 341. 
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3 Current South African social security dispute 
resolution system 
There is currently no uniform social security dispute resolution institution in 
South Africa. This is due to the piecemeal manner in which social security 
schemes were established and/or how protection against individual risks is 
regulated. The piecemeal manner in which the schemes were established 
and/or protection against individual risks are regulated has resulted in 
each statute providing for its own dispute resolution institution(s) and 
processes. There is a wide array of laws providing for dispute resolution 
institutions and procedures. The result is that the current social security 
dispute resolution system is fragmented and uncoordinated. The 
adjudication system is composed of the Independent Tribunal for Social 
Assistance Appeals established by the Social Assistance Act;22 the panel 
of a presiding officer assisted by two assessors (the so-called 
"Compensation Court") in terms of the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act (COIDA);23 the Certification Committee of the 
Medical Bureau for Occupational Diseases and the Medical Reviewing 
Authority for Occupational Diseases under the Occupational Diseases in 
Mines and Works Act (ODMWA);24 the Regional Appeals Committees and 
the National Appeals Committee of the Board of the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (UIF) in terms of the Unemployment Insurance Act 
(UIA);25 the Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal in terms of the Road 
Accident Fund Act (RAF Act);26 the Office of the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator established by the Pension Funds Act;27 and the Registrar and 
                                            
22 Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004. 
23 Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (COIDA). An 
objection against a decision of the Compensation Commissioner is considered and 
decided by a panel composed of a presiding officer with the assistance of two 
assessors also called the "Compensation Court" (see s 91(2) read with ss 2(1)(b) 
and 8(a) of COIDA.) 
24 Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 of 1973 (ODMWA). 
25 Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001. 
26 Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. Disputes relating to assessments of motor 
vehicle accident injuries (disputes where the Road Accident Fund or its agent 
objects to a serious injury report by a medical practitioner; or where an injured 
person objects to the Road Accident Fund's or its agent's rejection of a serious injury 
assessment report by a medical practitioner) are resolved by an Appeal Tribunal 
appointed by the Registrar of the Health Professions Council of South Africa 
(HPCSA) (see Reg 3(4) in GN 769 in GG 31249 of 21 July 2008). 
27 Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. The Financial Sector Regulation Bill [B34-2015] 
envisages the creation of an Ombud Regulatory Council and a Financial Services 
Tribunal to hear and decide appeals by persons aggrieved by a decision of a 
decision-maker in terms of a financial sector law (ss 173 and 214 of the Financial 
Sector Regulation Bill [B34-2015]). This means that when the law is enacted, 
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Appeal Board of the Council for Medical Schemes (CMS) regulated by the 
Medical Schemes Act.28 Appeal mechanisms are also fragmented across 
the social security system, at times involving specially constituted appeal 
bodies and at times the Labour or High Court.  
There are various other gaps and challenges that the current South 
African social security dispute resolution system faces. Some of these 
challenges relate to the inaccessibility of some social security institutions; 
the inappropriateness of some current appeal institutions; the lack of a 
systematic approach in establishing appeal institutions; the limited scope 
of jurisdiction and powers of adjudication institutions; inconsistencies in 
review and/or appeal provisions in various laws; the unavailability of 
alternative dispute resolution procedures; and the absence of the 
institutional independence of adjudication institutions or forums.  
3.1 Inaccessibility of some social security institutions 
The accessibility of the various adjudication institutions/ forums is not 
always appropriately ensured. While some forums are geographically 
spread across the Republic, others are centrally located. As an example, 
the Certification Committee and the Medical Reviewing Authority in terms 
of the ODMWA (together with the Medical Bureau for Occupational 
Diseases) are located in Johannesburg, while the National Appeals 
Committee of the UIF Board is located in Pretoria.  
The accessibility of the various adjudication forums is also facilitated 
through multiple application lodgement options29 and reasonable 
timeframes for lodging disputes.30 The relevant documentation for the 
lodging of applications and the consideration of disputes is in English and 
                                                                                                                       
decisions of the Pension Funds Adjudicator will be heard by the Ombud and 
Tribunal. 
28 Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998. 
29 An appeal to the Independent Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals against a 
decision of the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) may be delivered by 
hand, post, fax or electronic mail (see Reg 14(2)(b) in GN R746 in GG 34618 of 19 
September 2011)). An appeal to a Regional Appeals Committee of the UIF Board 
can also be made by submitting a Notice of Appeal Form (Form UI 13) either by 
hand or by registered post to the Committee at the respective Labour Centres of the 
Department of Labour (Reg 8(1) in GN 400 in GG 23283 of 28 March 2002). 
30 Most statutes stipulate that an appeal must be lodged within 90 days after 
(notification of) the decision. In the case of COIDA, the appeal timeframe is 180 days 
(see Reg 8(2) in GN 400 in GG 23283 of 28 March 2002; s 50(1) of ODMWA; Reg 
2(2) in GN R746 in GG 34618 of 19 September 2011; and Reg 3(4)(a) in GN 769 in 
GG 31249 of 21 July 2008). 
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the hearings (where applicable) are also conducted in English.31 However, 
interpreters are provided where necessary.32 
The speedy resolution of disputes is not guaranteed, as timeframes for 
finalisation have not been stated in many statutes.33 In addition, no power 
is granted to the adjudication forums to reconsider their original decision 
(except as provided in terms of COIDA that a Presiding Officer may 
correct the error or defect).34 
The adjudication forums adopt a variety of dispute resolution procedures. 
Where necessary, some of the adjudication forums can convene a 
hearing, in which case the personal attendance of the parties and other 
interested persons is possible. However, some forums resolve disputes by 
means of documentary evidence only.35 
External dispute resolution avenues are only through litigation in the High 
Court (at times the Labour Court).36 Due to its inherent review powers, all 
the decisions of public social security institutions are reviewable (on the 
basis of judicial review) by the High Court (except where expressly 
provided otherwise). Specific issues to be dealt with by the High Court on 
                                            
31 See, for example, the Compensation Fund Objection against a Decision Form (Form 
WG 29); and the RAF Objection Form. 
32 As an example, the Compensation Fund appoints interpreters in some hearing 
locations of the "Compensation Court" for assistance where an objector is unable to 
understand the language of the hearing (see Compensation Fund Annual Report 
2009 34). 
33 It is only the Independent Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals which is required to 
finalise an appeal within 90 days of the date on which the appeal was received (see 
Reg 16(2) in GN R746 in GG 34618 of 19 September 2011). 
34 See Rule 18 of the Rules for the Conduct of Hearings Before the Compensation 
Court in Section 91 Hearings of COIDA. 
35 This is the case in the review of a Certification Committee disease certification 
decision by the Medical Reviewing Authority for Occupational Diseases in terms of s 
50(1) of ODMWA; the consideration of the decision of the Regional Appeals 
Committees by the National Appeals Committee of the UIF Board (an appeal is 
made to the Committee by submitting the Notice of Appeal Form (UI 13) to the head 
office of the UIF (Reg 8(2) in GN 400 in GG 23283 of 28 March 2002)); the 
consideration of the (reconsidered) decisions of SASSA by the Independent Tribunal 
for Social Assistance Appeals (parties who disagree with the decision and reasons 
of SASSA and who wish to appeal the decision are required to lodge an appeal to 
the Independent Tribunal in the prescribed form (see Form 3 (Lodging of an Appeal) 
in GN R746 in GG 34618 of 19 September 2011)); and the resolution of appeals by 
the Road Accident Fund Appeals Tribunal (some appeals of the Tribunal can be 
decided without a hearing (see Reg 3(4) in GN 769 in GG 31249 of 21 July 2008)). 
36 Such as in s 66 of the UIA, which provides for objections to compliance orders to be 
referred to the Labour Court, and for a compliance order to be referred to the Labour 
Court to be made an order of the Court. 
MAT NYENTI  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  9 
the basis of appeal are also outlined in some laws.37 In addition, some 
laws provide for the resolution of disputes by the High Court in the first 
instance. For example, the RAF Act requires a person with a claim against 
the fund to bring a claim in any High Court within whose area of 
jurisdiction the occurrence which caused the injury or death took place.38 It 
is doubtful whether the High Court is the appropriate venue for the 
resolution of such disputes due to its inaccessibility.39 
3.2 Inappropriateness of some current appeal institutions 
Some social security statutes provide for reviews by and appeals to the 
ordinary courts (especially the High Court). However, the ordinary courts 
are not always the appropriate forums to deal with social security appeals. 
The powers of these courts to deal with the matters are unsatisfactory, as 
the courts mostly have review powers with little appeal powers. They are 
also apparently not specialised enough to deal effectively with social 
security matters. Appeals to such courts may also pose difficulties for 
aggrieved persons, due inter alia to limited access to the courts especially 
for indigent persons (also due to costs in the absence of legal aid); undue 
delays that characterise court proceedings; and the technical and legalistic 
basis upon which cases are decided (with little regard to broader fairness 
considerations). This leads to the contention that: the current South 
African social security system has a large backlog in terms of the pool of 
beneficiaries. Yet, the adjudication system is not sufficiently specialised 
and localised, from the perspective of access to the system. Instead, the 
beneficiaries cannot financially afford the system of legal representation in 
the normal court context. Those who could afford to pay the costs still face 
a punitive snail paced legal bureaucratic process. Tedious as it is, the 
                                            
37 In terms of s 92 of COIDA, the Compensation Commissioner can also state a case 
on a question of law to the High Court; ODMWA also empowers the Compensation 
Commissioner for Occupational Diseases to also state a case on a question of law to 
the High Court on appeal (s 58(1) of ODMWA). 
38 Section 15(2) of the RAF Act. 
39 Provincial or local divisions of the High Court are currently located in Port Elizabeth, 
Durban, Umtata/Mthatha, Pietermaritzburg, Grahamstown, Cape Town, Bhisho, 
Polokwane, Thohoyandou, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Mmabatho/Mafikeng, Kimberley 
and Bloemfontein (see Renaming of High Courts Act 30 of 2008). A person 
(especially an indigent person) may have limited or no access to the High Court due 
to the high cost of court proceedings and the absence of legal aid. In addition, the 
purely technical and legalistic basis of dealing with cases means a person who 
brings a case to the High Court requires legal representation, which an indigent 
person can hardly afford (see Committee of Inquiry Transforming the Present 124; 
Cele v the South African Social Security Agency and 22 Related Cases 2009 5 SA 
105 (D); and The Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 
Provincial Government v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA)). 
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system leaves out the bulk of marginalised social security beneficiaries 
when they lodge a complaint.40 
3.3 Lack of a systematic approach in establishing appeal 
institutions 
There is also a lack of a systematic approach to the regulation of appeals 
in the South African social security system. While some laws specifically 
provide for the establishment and functioning of appeal institutions and 
mechanisms, other laws leave such issues to the discretion of the relevant 
Minister.41 It is inappropriate to establish an appeal tribunal purely on the 
basis of Ministerial or Registrar direction/regulation, also due to the gravity 
and importance of the issues at stake, such as the establishment of the 
institution; the appointment of its members; its main objective(s); its 
jurisdiction, functions and powers; procedures for the disposal of 
complaints; giving parties an opportunity to comment and to be 
represented; time limits; record-keeping; making a determination and the 
enforceability of determinations; a review possibility; accountability; 
remuneration; and a limitation on liability etc.42 
3.4 Limited scope of jurisdiction and powers of adjudication 
institutions 
The scope of the jurisdiction and the powers of the social security 
adjudication institutions/forums are limited. They can exercise the powers 
and functions only as circumscribed in legislation. The scope of the 
jurisdiction and the powers of the High Court as the appeal institution are 
also sometimes limited, particularly in relation to the types of cases or 
issues that it can decide. The High Court is mostly empowered to review 
decisions taken by the institutions concerned. 
                                            
40 Kanyane "Exploring and Developing a Culture of Good Governance" 104. 
41 An example of such a situation is the Social Assistance Act, which empowers the 
Minister (of Social Development) to either consider an appeal against a decision of 
SASSA him/herself; or appoint an independent tribunal to consider such an appeal. 
Where a tribunal is so appointed, all appeals against decisions of the Agency must 
from then on be considered by that tribunal (s 18(1A) of the Social Assistance Act). 
In addition, in the case of the RAF, upon receipt of the notification from a party to the 
dispute or 60 days after receiving submissions, medical reports and opinions 
relevant to the dispute period, the Registrar will refer the dispute for consideration by 
an Appeal Tribunal paid for by the RAF (Reg 3(8)(a) in GN 769 in GG 31249 of 21 
July 2008).  
42 See Olivier, Fourie and Nyenti Commentary 6. 
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The possible remedies that can be provided by the social security 
institutions are also limited due to the circumscription of such remedies in 
the various statutes. This emanates from the circumscribed powers 
afforded to the social security institutions.  
Some of the social security statutes stipulate that the decisions of the 
adjudication forums are binding on the administrative institutions; and the 
"Compensation Court" is considered to have the status of a magistrate's 
court (with its decisions enforced as such). However, most of the 
adjudication forums are not afforded the power and mechanisms to 
enforce their rulings.43 
In addition, the effectiveness of some of the institutions is restricted due to 
the provision of multiple dispute resolution avenues in some statutes. An 
example is in the Pension Funds Act where a party could lodge a 
complaint within the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator in a civil court (a High 
Court).44 This is problematic as it encourages "forum shopping"45 and 
undermines the objective of the establishment of the Office of the 
Adjudicator – to dispose of complaints in a procedurally fair, economical 
and expeditious manner. 
3.5 Inconsistencies in review and/or appeal provisions in various 
laws 
Most social security statutes fail to make an appropriate distinction 
between (internal) reviews and (external) appeal procedures. Social 
security adjudication standards require that the administrative 
organs/institutions that undertake the determination of applicants' rights to 
social security benefits should also undertake internal review procedures 
(first level adjudication procedures). As the Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive System of Social Security in South Africa stated, one of 
the guiding principles in devising an appropriate social security 
                                            
43 The exception is the Pension Funds Adjudicator, whose determination is deemed to 
be a civil judgment of any court of law as if the matter in question had been heard by 
such a court, and is noted as such by the clerk or the registrar of the court. A writ or 
warrant of execution may also be issued by the clerk or the registrar of such a court 
and be executed by the sheriff six weeks after the date of the determination if an 
appeal has not been made to the High Court (s 30O of the Pension Funds Act). 
44 The Adjudicator cannot investigate a complaint if, before the lodging of the 
complaint, proceedings have been instituted in any civil court in respect of a matter 
which would constitute the subject matter of the investigation (s 30H(2) of the 
Pension Funds Act). 
45 Forum shopping refers to the practice where a party selects a dispute resolution 
avenue with the best possible prospects. 
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adjudication system is the need to ensure that an institutional separation 
exists between administrative accountability, review and revision, and a 
wholly independent, substantive system of adjudication.46 This implies that 
where an applicant for social security benefits is aggrieved by a decision 
of the administering institution, he/she should be able to request a revision 
of the initial decision. After the exhaustion of the internal review (first level) 
processes, applicants should have access to an external appeal 
mechanism or institution (second level procedures). 
In some of the social security statutes there is a conflation of first- and 
second-level adjudication procedures and of the administrative and 
adjudicative roles. This is the case with ODMWA, which provides that if 
the Reviewing Authority for Occupational Diseases disagrees with a 
decision of the Certification Committee, the Chairperson of the Authority is 
required to request the Chairperson of the Certification Committee to 
submit the case for review to a joint meeting of the Certification Committee 
and the Reviewing Authority.47 It is only in a review of a finding of the 
Certification Committee by a joint Reviewing Authority/Certification 
Committee meeting that the finding of the Certification Committee can be 
rescinded or replaced with the joint meeting's own finding.48 The process 
has been hailed as a beneficial one because: 
… this means that before a final decision is made the case has been 
discussed in at least three meetings by, in all, ten doctors. Every one of 
these has been able to state his opinion and debate difficult medical points 
with his colleagues so as to contribute toward a fair decision.49 
However, it brings into question both the existence and the effectiveness 
of the Reviewing Authority as an independent body established to review 
the findings of the Certification Committee. 
There is also a lack of consistency in the provisions relating to reviews and 
appeals in the various laws. Some laws make provision for appeals to 
appeal bodies established in terms of the relevant laws,50 while other laws 
provide for appeals to other adjudication bodies such as the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa and the High Court.51 
                                            
46 Committee of Inquiry Transforming the Present 124. 
47 Section 50(2) of ODMWA. 
48 Section 52(1) of ODMWA. 
49 Wiles 1987 SAMJ 417.  
50 See for example the case of the UIA and ODMWA. 
51 A dispute relating to the assessment of motor vehicle accident injuries under the 
Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 is resolved by an Appeal Tribunal (Road 
Accident Fund Tribunal) appointed by the Registrar of the HPCSA. A person who is 
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3.6 Unavailability of alternative dispute resolution procedures 
Social security disputes are resolved mainly by resort to litigation 
(adversarial adjudication). Few social security statutes provide for external 
dispute resolution avenues other than litigation in the normal court 
system.52 The absence of alternative dispute resolution avenues in South 
African social security statutes implies that persons not satisfied with the 
internal adjudication processes can have their right of access to social 
security enforced only by means of (adversarial) litigation in the ordinary 
courts of law. However, the various problems plaguing the current court 
structure indicate that the courts are not the most appropriate forum for the 
resolution of social security disputes. The need for litigation therefore has 
an adverse impact on the right to access to social security of 
beneficiaries/applicants, as it restricts access to adjudication. Therefore, 
alternative mechanisms for the resolution of disputes should be 
considered in the South African social security system. This is to ensure 
proper redress for social security litigants and to promote their right to 
access to social security. 
3.7 Lack of institutional independence of adjudication 
institutions/forums 
A review of the current South African social security dispute resolution 
institutions/forums reveals that most of the adjudication forums or 
institutions can effectively be regarded as internal organs of the social 
                                                                                                                       
dissatisfied with the decision of the Tribunal can appeal to the High Court for a 
review of the Tribunal's decision (see Reg 3(4) in GN 769 in GG 31249 of 21 July 
2008). The RAF Act requires a person with a claim against the Fund to bring an 
action in any High Court within whose area of jurisdiction the occurrence which 
caused the injury or death took place (s 15(2) of the RAF Act). COIDA states that the 
Compensation Commissioner can state a case on a question of law to the High 
Court (s 92 of COIDA). In terms of ODMWA, the Compensation Commissioner for 
Occupational Diseases can also state a case on a question of law to the High Court 
on appeal (s 58(1) of ODMWA). 
52 The only exception can be found in COIDA (which provides for the organisation of 
pre-trial conferences); and the Pension Funds Act (which provides for alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms, including conciliation and/or arbitration). Parties to a 
COIDA hearing are required to hold a pre-hearing conference, if directed to do so by 
the presiding officer. In a pre-hearing conference, the parties must attempt to reach 
consensus on any means by which the dispute(s) can be settled (Rule 13 of the 
Rules for the Conduct of Hearings before the Compensation Court in Section 91 
Hearings of COIDA). The Pension Funds Act provides that prior to investigating a 
complaint and if it is expedient, the Pension Funds Adjudicator may require any 
complainant first to approach an organisation established for the purpose of 
resolving disputes in the pension funds industry or part thereof, and approved by the 
registrar (s 30E(1)(b) of the Pension Funds Act). 
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security institutions and as therefore not being independent of these 
institutions. The only exceptions are the Office of the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator and (in some respects) the Council for Medical Schemes 
Appeal Board. In the first place, the Ministers or Directors-General of the 
relevant Departments in charge of the relevant social security institution 
are in most instances responsible for the appointment of members of the 
adjudication forums.53 The relevant Ministers or Directors-General also 
determine the length and (other) conditions of employment of members, 
including remuneration. Ministers or Directors-General can also discipline 
the members and terminate their appointment.54 
In addition, most of the social security adjudications institutions/forums 
also do not have independent funding through direct appropriations from 
Parliament (the Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator and the CMS 
being the exception).55 They are mostly funded by the relevant 
departments as part of the Departments' annual budget allocations.56 The 
financial dependence of the adjudication forums is also indicated by the 
fact that they are not independent accountable institutions in terms of the 
Public Finance Management Act.57 Management, governance, oversight 
and supervision are also undertaken by the departmental or institutional 
heads; and the adjudication forums are also required to report to 
departmental or institutional heads (in the case of the Road Accident Fund 
Appeal Tribunal, to the Registrar of the HPCSA). Human resource and 
administrative support is provided either by the social security 
administration institutions or (in the case of the Road Accident Fund 
Appeal Tribunal), the HPCSA.58 
3.8  The need for an appropriate framework 
The gaps and challenges in the current social security dispute resolution 
system indicate that it is unable to realise the right to access to justice and 
related rights of users of the system, contrary to the prescriptions of 
section 34 of the Constitution. There is thus a need for the establishment 
                                            
53 See, for example, Reg 3(8)(a) in GN 769 in GG 31249 of 21 July 2008; s 2(1)(b) 
read with the definition of presiding officer in s 1 in COIDA; s 40(2)(b) of ODMWA; s 
47 of the UIA; and Reg 4 in GN R746 in GG 34618 of 19 September 2011. 
54 See, for example, s 8(5) of COIDA; s 41 of ODMWA; s 47 of the UIA; and Reg 4 in 
GN R746 in GG 34618 of 19 September 2011. 
55 See s 30T(1) of the Pension Funds Act and s 13 of the Medical Schemes Act. 
56 See Reg 6 in GN 16 in GG 30646 of 11 January 2008; s 41(1) of ODMWA; s 51 of 
the UIA; and Reg 3(8)(a) in GN 769 in GG 31249 of 21 July 2008. 
57 Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA). 
58 See ss 12, 14 and 50 of the Medical Schemes Act. 
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of an appropriate framework. The establishment of such a framework is 
further motivated by the gravity and importance of the issues at stake. 
This calls for the introduction of special and earmarked adjudication 
institutions and procedures, in order to deal effectively with social security 
disputes. The Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of 
Social Security59 in South Africa has thus recommended that: 
… a uniform adjudication system be established to deal conclusively with all 
social security claims. It should, in the first instance, involve an independent 
internal review or appeal institution. It should, in the second place, involve a 
court (which could be a specialised court) which has the power to finally 
adjudicate all social security matters, and that this court has the power to 
determine cases on the basis of law and fairness. The jurisdiction of this 
court should cover all social security claims, whether under the new UIA, the 
RAFA, the COIDA and all the other benefits (including the Social Assistance 
Act) emanating from the social security system (including claims falling 
under the jurisdiction of the Pension Funds Adjudicator). 
Institutions, mechanisms and procedures in the labour relations, business 
competition regulation and the consumer protection jurisdictions provide a 
possible benchmark in the development of an effective social security 
dispute resolution system. These institutions and their procedures have 
also been established to realise the rights to access to justice and to a fair 
trial of their respective users. 
4 Access to justice in comparative South African 
jurisdictions 
Adjudication institutions, mechanisms and procedures in the labour 
relations, business competition regulation and the consumer protection 
jurisdictions have been established to ensure access to justice.60 In order 
to achieve this purpose, integrated and streamlined systems have been 
created, consisting of specialist multi-tiered institutions that are accessible 
                                            
59 Committee of Inquiry Transforming the Present 124. 
60 As an example, the LRA states that one of its objectives is to provide simple 
procedures for the resolution of labour disputes through statutory conciliation, 
mediation and arbitration, and through independent alternative dispute resolution 
services accredited for that purpose (s 1(d)(iv) of the LRA). It has been stated that in 
establishing a new dispute resolution system that places a premium on conciliation, 
mediation and arbitration (and less on litigation, amongst other things), the LRA 
sought to satisfy the need for expeditious, efficient and affordable procedures and 
easily accessible, specialist, but informal institutions in specified disputes in the 
labour terrain (see Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 399). The National Credit Regulator 
and National Consumer Tribunal have also been established "to make it easier and 
less expensive for consumers and credit providers to resolve their disputes" and are 
important mechanisms in the promotion of consumer rights in South Africa (see 
Woker Date Unknown http://tinyurl.com/jfm3h9u). 
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and guarantee complementary and seamless procedurally-fair dispute 
resolution processes.61 The multi-tiered and complementary nature of 
these dispute resolution institutions, their status and procedures guarantee 
their effectiveness in resolving disputes. In the first instance, their nature 
enables them to undertake sequential and complementary reviews and 
appeals procedures, which are a primary consideration in the development 
of an adjudication system, as there is a need to ensure an institutional 
separation between administrative accountability, review and revision (on 
the one hand) and a wholly-independent, substantive system of appeals 
(on the other).62 It also allows for the resolution of disputes at an 
appropriate level. It further ensures the independence of the appeal 
institution from the administration that reviewed the initial complaint, which 
is a necessary aspect of the concept of appeal.63 Other factors promoting 
their effectiveness include their accessibility, the fairness of their 
procedures, the scope of their jurisdiction and powers, their expertise and 
their independence and impartiality. 
4.1  Accessibility of adjudication institutions 
Attempts to make the institutions accessible are not always appropriately 
made. Some of the institutions convene in as many places as is 
necessary; while others have a single centrally-located presence.64 
                                            
61 In the case of the labour relations jurisdiction, the LRA established the CCMA and 
enabled other independent alternative dispute resolution services to resolve 
disputes. The Act also created the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court as 
superior courts, with exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters arising from the Act (see 
Preamble of the LRA). On its part, the Competition Act established the Competition 
Commission, the Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court as 
independent bodies for the achievement of the objectives of the Act, which include 
the resolution of disputes (see Introduction to the Competition Act).  
62 Olivier, Van Rensburg and Mpedi "Adjudication and Enforcement of Social Security" 
526. Also see Committee of Inquiry Transforming the Present 124, where it is 
recommended that a uniform adjudication system be established to deal conclusively 
with all social security claims. Such a system should, in the first place, comprise an 
independent internal review or appeal institution. In the second place, according to 
the Committee, the system should comprise a court (which could be a specialised 
court) that has the power to finally adjudicate upon all social security matters. 
63 See the provisions of the ILO Employment Promotion and Protection against 
Unemployment Convention 168 of 1988 (art 27(1)) and ILO Social Security 
(Minimum Standards) Convention 102 of 1952 (art 70) and remarks by the ILO in 
this regard in ILO Social Security and the Rule of Law para 434. 
64 The CCMA has offices in all the provinces, with more than one office in some 
provinces. Labour Courts are currently situated in Cape Town, Durban, 
Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth. However, sessions of the Labour Court can be 
held in other locations if there are available judges (in which case the court sits as a 
circuit court) (s 152 of the LRA). However, the Competition Tribunal has a national 
office in Pretoria, which implies appeals and review applications must be forwarded 
to this single office. The National Credit Tribunal also has a single national location 
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Accessibility is facilitated, however, by appropriate dispute lodgement 
procedures and time limits.65 Accessibility is further promoted by the wide 
scope of possible claimants as the institutions also allow non-individual 
claimants to bring disputes in some cases.66 
                                                                                                                       
in Centurion, Pretoria. Persons who want to submit complaints to the Tribunal must 
forward these to this office. 
65 In terms of CCMA dispute lodgement procedures and time periods, any party to a 
dispute about a matter of mutual interest may refer the dispute in writing to the 
CCMA. The party who refers the dispute to the Commission must satisfy it that a 
copy of the referral has been served on all the other parties to the dispute (ss 134(1) 
and (2) of the LRA). Where it is required for a dispute to be resolved through 
arbitration, the CCMA appoints a Commissioner to arbitrate that dispute, if a 
Commissioner has issued a certificate stating that the dispute remains unresolved; 
and if within 90 days after the date on which the certificate was issued, any party to 
the dispute has requested that the dispute be resolved through arbitration. However, 
the CCMA may condone a party's non-observance of that timeframe and allow a 
request for arbitration filed by the party after the expiry of the 90-day period where 
good cause is shown (s 136(1) of the LRA). In addition, Labour Court dispute 
lodgement procedures and time periods promote access to the court. Generally, 
referral of a dispute to the Labour Court must be made within 90 days after the 
CCMA certifies that the dispute remains unresolved. However, the Labour Court may 
condone non-observance of that timeframe where good cause is shown (s 191(11) 
of the LRA and Rule 12(3) of the Rules of the Labour Court). An application to the 
Labour Court for the review of a CCMA arbitration award must be made within 6 
weeks of the award (s 145(1) of the LRA). The Court may also condone the late filing 
of an application for review where good cause is shown for such late filing (s 145(1A) 
of the LRA). In terms of the Competition Act, the Competition Commissioner can 
initiate a complaint against an alleged prohibited practice. A person can also submit 
information concerning an alleged prohibited practice to the Competition 
Commission in any manner or form, or in the prescribed form. Complaints can be 
delivered by hand, by mail, or communicated by telephone, fax or email (s 49B(1) 
and (2) of the Competition Act and Rule 14 of the Rules for the Conduct of 
Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal). A complaint against a prohibited practice 
can be made up to three years after the practice was stopped (s 67(1) of the 
Competition Act). A person or entity that is registered with the National Credit 
Regulator or an applicant for registration may file a complaint with the National 
Consumer Tribunal within 20 business days after the National Credit Regulator 
makes the decision that is the subject of the application. However, the Tribunal may 
allow a party to file a complaint at a later time where good cause is shown for the 
delay (s 137(2) of the National Credit Act). A consumer or credit provider who has 
unsuccessfully attempted to resolve a dispute directly with another party, or through 
an alternative dispute resolution process, may also file an application at any time 
within 20 business days after the failure of the attempted alternative dispute 
resolution. The Tribunal may also allow such a party to file a complaint at a later time 
where good cause is shown for the delay (s 137(3) of the National Credit Act). 
66 The LRA states that persons who can bring a case to the CCMA include one or more 
employees; or one or more trade unions; or one or more trade unions and one or 
more employees who can bring a dispute against one or more employers; one or 
more employers' organisations; or one or more employers' organisations and one or 
more employers.  
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4.2  Scope of jurisdiction and powers of adjudication institutions 
The scope of the jurisdiction and the powers of these institutions are also 
fairly wide. As an example, parties can lodge a dispute with the CCMA 
about any matter of mutual interest.67 However, as creatures of statute, 
they can resolve only disputes falling within the purview of the statute. In 
this regard, the Competition Appeal Court has held that the Competition 
Tribunal is an administrative tribunal which can exercise jurisdiction only to 
the extent permitted by the Competition Act.68 The Tribunal's jurisdiction is, 
therefore, confined to a consideration of the complaint as referred. The 
terms of the complaint to be decided by the Tribunal are also constrained 
by the terms of the complaint initiated by the Competition Commissioner or 
by some other person or entity. Accordingly, if the original ground for the 
complaint is that there was a prohibited agreement,69 the Tribunal cannot 
determine it on the basis that there was a concerted practice or vice 
versa.70 It has also been held that as a creation of the LRA, the CCMA can 
resolve only such disputes as fall within the purview of the LRA (ie 
disputes between employers and employees).71 Some laws clarify this by 
the use of terms such as "any matter in this Act".72 
                                            
67 Section 134(1) of the LRA (emphasis added). 
68 See Omnia Fertilizer Ltd v The Competition Commission In Re: The Competition 
Commission of South Africa v Sasol Chemical Industries (Pty) Ltd (CAC) Case No 
77/CAC/Jul08. 
69 Chapter 2 of the Competition Act deals with certain conduct which is prohibited 
because it is harmful to competition in the relevant market. Commercial activities 
which are prohibited under the Competition Act are concerned with conduct relating 
to a firm's interaction with its competitors (a horizontal relationship), interaction with 
its customers and suppliers (a vertical relationship), and unilateral conduct by a 
dominant firm (abuse of dominance). 
70 See Netstar (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission (CAC) Cases No.99/CAC/MAY10; 
98/CAC/MAY10 and 97/CAC/MAY10 para 26. In terms of s 1 of the Competition Act, 
"concerted practice" means co-operative, or co-ordinated conduct between firms, 
achieved through direct or indirect contact, that replaces their independent action, 
but which does not amount to an agreement. 
71 Sapekoe Tea Estates (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner Maake 2002 23 ILJ 1603 (LC). Also 
see Bosch "Jurisdictional Issues at the CCMA". 
72 See, for example, s 27 of the Competition Act, which states that the Competition 
Tribunal may adjudicate on any conduct prohibited in terms of ch 2, to determine 
whether prohibited conduct has occurred, and if so, to impose any remedy provided 
for in this Act; adjudicate on any other matter that may, in terms of this Act, be 
considered by it, and make any order provided for in this Act; hear appeals from, or 
review any decision of, the Competition Commission that may, in terms of this Act, 
be referred to it; and make any ruling or order necessary or incidental to the 
performance of its functions in terms of this Act. 
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In addition, the institutions have extensive powers, such as the power to 
subpoena persons.73 This implies that the institutions are also able to 
provide a wide range of remedies, including (in some cases and in matters 
within their jurisdiction) making an order which any court of law may make, 
providing interim relief and making cost orders.74 
                                            
73 As an example, a CCMA commissioner has the power to subpoena persons when 
attempting to resolve a dispute (s 142 of the LRA). The member of the National 
Consumer Tribunal presiding at a hearing has the power to direct or summon any 
person to appear at any specified time and place. He or she can question any 
person under oath; order any person to produce any book, document or item 
necessary for the purposes of the hearing; and perform any other action in relation to 
the Act (s 144 of the National Credit Act). 
74 CCMA commissioners can make any appropriate arbitration award in terms of the 
LRA, including, but not limited to, an award which gives effect to any collective 
agreement, which gives effect to the provisions and primary objects of the Act and 
which includes, or is in the form of a declaratory order (s 138(9) of the LRA). The 
Commissioner can make an order for the payment of costs according to the 
requirements of law and fairness (s 138(10) of the LRA). The CCMA can also make 
any settlement agreement in respect of any dispute that has been referred to it to be 
an arbitration award (if agreed to between the parties or on application by a party) (s 
142A of the LRA). The National Consumer Tribunal can confirm a resolution or 
agreement as a consent order, which may include an award of damages to a 
complainant (with the consent of the complainant) (see s 138 of the National Credit 
Act and Liphoko v Absa Bank Case No NCT/253/2009/138(1) (P) (April 2010)).The 
Tribunal can make an appropriate order in relation to prohibited conduct or required 
conduct in terms of Act (including the power to grant interim relief; declaring conduct 
to be prohibited in terms of the Act; interdicting any prohibited conduct; imposing an 
administrative fine in terms of s 15 with or without the addition of any other order; 
confirming a consent agreement as an order of the Tribunal; condoning any non-
compliance of its rules and procedures on good cause shown; confirming an order 
against an unregistered person to cease engaging in any activity that is required to 
be registered in terms of the Act; suspending or cancelling the registrant's 
registration; requiring repayment to the consumer of any excess amount charged 
(together with interest at the rate set out in the agreement); or any other appropriate 
order contemplated in the Act which is required to give effect to a right (see ss149 
and 150 of the National Credit Act; Motitsoe v Randburg Finance Case No 
NCT/253/2009/138 (1) (P) (April 2010); National Credit Regulator v Chatspare Pty 
Ltd Case No NCT/08/2008/140 (1) (P) (July 2008); and Malan v Amalgamated 
Banks of South Africa (Absa) Case No NCT/22/2008/149(1) (P) (30 October 2008). If 
the Tribunal does not make a finding against a respondent, the presiding member at 
a hearing can award costs to the respondent and against a complainant who 
referred the complaint. If the Tribunal makes a finding against a respondent, the 
member of the Tribunal presiding at a hearing can also award costs against the 
respondent and to a complainant who referred the complaint (s 147 of the National 
Credit Act). 
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Effectiveness is further promoted by providing some of the institutions that 
are not courts of law with powers to enforce their decisions.75 The 
decisions of such institutions are deemed to be the judgment of a court 
and are therefore enforceable as such. As an example, an arbitration 
award issued by a Commissioner is final and binding and it may be 
enforced as if it were an order of the Labour Court, unless it is an advisory 
arbitration award.76 If a party fails to comply with an arbitration award that 
orders the performance of an act, other than the payment of an amount of 
money, any other party to the award may enforce it by way of contempt 
proceedings instituted in the Labour Court.77 
A decision, judgment or order of the Competition Tribunal may be served, 
executed and enforced as if it were an order of the High Court.78 A 
decision, judgment or order of the National Consumer Tribunal is also 
served, executed and enforced as if it were an order of the High Court, 
and is binding on the National Credit Regulator; provincial credit 
regulators; a consumer court; an alternative dispute resolution agent or the 
ombud with jurisdiction; a debt counsellor; and a Magistrate's Court.79 
4.3  Procedural fairness of adjudication institutions 
The procedures of the adjudication institutions promote the resolution of 
disputes quickly and fairly. In the case of the CCMA, it attempts to resolve 
any dispute referred to it in terms of the LRA through conciliation.80 A 
Commissioner is appointed, who then attempts to resolve the dispute 
through conciliation within 30 days of the date the CCMA received the 
referral. However, the parties can agree to extend the 30-day period.81 
Adjudication institutions allow the personal appearance of parties to a 
dispute and other interested parties in most cases. The CCMA is an 
example of this, as during arbitration hearings a party to the dispute may 
appear in person or be represented only by a legal practitioner; a Director 
or employee of the party; or any member, office bearer or official of that 
                                            
75 A determination of the Pension Funds Adjudicator is deemed to be a civil judgment 
of any court of law. A writ or warrant of execution may be issued by the clerk or the 
registrar of such a court and be executed by the sheriff (s 30O of the Pension Funds 
Act). 
76 Section 143(1) of the LRA. An arbitration award may be enforced only if the Director 
has certified that the arbitration award is not an advisory award (s143(3) of the LRA). 
77 Section 143(4) of the LRA. 
78 Section 64(1) of the Competition Act. 
79 Section152 (1) of the National Credit Act. 
80 Sections 115(1(a) and 133(1) of the LRA 
81 Section 135 of the LRA. 
MAT NYENTI  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  21 
party's registered trade union or registered employers' organisation.82 
Parties to a hearing of the Competition Tribunal also have a right to 
personal appearance and to representation.83 
Institutions are also empowered to determine adjudication procedures, 
which gives scope for the adoption of flexible procedures. Adjudication 
institutions determine the process in attempting to resolve a dispute. In 
CCMA conciliation hearings, the Commissioner determines the process to 
attempt to resolve the dispute, which includes mediating the dispute, 
conducting a fact-finding exercise and making a recommendation to the 
parties, which can be in the form of an advisory arbitration award. Legal 
representation is not allowed in conciliation proceedings, which means the 
procedure is simple.84 In arbitration hearings the Commissioner conducts 
the hearing in a manner he or she considers appropriate in order to 
determine the dispute fairly and quickly, but must deal with the substantial 
merits of the dispute with the minimum of legal formalities.85 
The Competition Tribunal proceedings are conducted as expeditiously as 
possible, and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Hearings 
may also be conducted informally or in an inquisitorial manner.86 The 
Chairperson of the Tribunal may order that a matter be heard in chambers, 
if no oral evidence will be heard. He or she can also order that oral 
submissions be made at the hearing; or that they are made by telephone 
or video conference, if it is in the interests of justice and expediency to do 
so.87 
The National Consumer Tribunal also conducts its hearings in an 
inquisitorial manner.88 Tribunal proceedings are conducted as 
expeditiously and informally as possible, and in accordance with the 
principles of natural justice.89 Hearings are relatively simple to follow, 
which means parties do not need legal representation. There are also very 
few costs involved. It has been remarked that: 
The complaint can be expressed in a laymen's undefined narratory style …. 
And proof on a balance of probabilities is adequate. ... The approach of the 
NCT should be that, subject to statute, the NCT is guided only by the rules of 
                                            
82 See Rule 25 of the Rules of Conduct of Proceedings Before the CCMA. 
83 Rule 44 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal. 
84 See Rule 25(1) of the Rules of Conduct of Proceedings Before the CCMA. 
85 Section 138(1) of the LRA. 
86 Section 52(2)(a) and (b) of the Competition Act. 
87 Section 52(2A) of the Competition Act. 
88 Section 142(2) of the National Credit Act. 
89 Section 142(1) of the National Credit Act. 
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natural justice. In that context the object and test for using the inquisitorial 
power is not to pursue to a point against anyone who is not a consumer as if 
he were the enemy. The inquisitorial power exists to get to the bottom of 
facts that are material to reaching a correct finding on the properly raised 
complaint.90 
Parties participate in the resolution of disputes in person or through a 
representative. Parties to a hearing of the Competition Tribunal can put 
questions to witnesses and inspect any books, documents or items 
presented at the hearing.91 If permitted by the CCMA Commissioner, a 
party to the dispute can also give evidence, call witnesses, question the 
witnesses of any other party, and address concluding arguments.92 Parties 
to a hearing of the National Consumer Tribunal and any other person who 
has a material interest in the hearing may participate in the hearing in 
person or through a representative.93 They may put questions to witnesses 
and inspect any books, documents or items presented at the hearing. 
The participation of parties to the dispute is facilitated by the use of 
multiple languages in dispute resolution proceedings. The National 
Consumer Tribunal is an example of this, with its language policy stating 
that the Tribunal will endeavour to make use of any of the eleven official 
South African languages as well as the South African Sign Language and 
Braille where practicable, on request.94 
The participation of parties to the dispute is further promoted through the 
provision of interpreters and translators by some institutions. Such is the 
case with the Competition Tribunal, where interpreters and translators are 
provided during hearings for persons who do not understand the language 
of the hearing.95 
                                            
90 Fleming J in National Credit Regulator v Chatspare Pty Ltd Case No 
NCT/08/2008/140 (1) (P) (July 2008) paras 7-9. 
91 Section 53 of the Competition Act. 
92 Section 138(2) of the LRA. 
93 Section 143 of the National Credit Act. 
94 The Policy states that one of the principles underlying it is the promotion of good 
language management by the Tribunal to ensure efficient and effective public 
service administration and approachability and accessibility that meets the needs of 
the public and ensures equitable access to the services and information of the 
Tribunal. The factors to be taken into account in arriving at the choice of official 
language(s) the Tribunal will use in each context/situation are usage; practicality; 
expense; regional circumstances; and the balance of the needs and preference of 
the public it serves (see National Consumer Tribunal Language Policy in GN 293 in 
GG 38659 of 31 March 2015). 
95 Rule 49 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal. 
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Legislation provides the adjudication institutions with alternative dispute 
resolution processes in furtherance of their objectives. A member of the 
Competition Tribunal assigned by the Chairperson is empowered to 
convene a pre-hearing conference. Such a pre-hearing conference is 
convened on a date and at a time determined by the member with the 
Competition Commission, each complainant who has filed a Complaint 
Referral, intervenors and the respondent.96 A pre-hearing conference is 
used (inter alia) to give directions in respect of clarifying and simplifying 
issues in dispute; obtaining admissions of particular facts or documents; 
the production and discovery of documents whether formal or informal; the 
witnesses to be called by the Tribunal at the hearing, the questioning of 
witnesses and the language in which each witness will testify; the 
determination of the procedure to be followed at the hearing, and its 
expected duration; a date, time and schedule for the hearing; and any 
other matters that may aid in resolving the complaint.97 A pre-hearing 
conference may be conducted in person or by telephone or both. It is not 
required that the pre-hearing conference must follow formal rules of 
procedure, and it is not open to the public.98 
In order to promote the informal resolution of disputes between parties, the 
National Credit Act requires that in any dispute between a credit provider 
and a consumer that may be referred to the National Consumer Tribunal 
(excluding complaints that could be resolved informally or investigated) 
and before parties may apply directly to the Tribunal, they must attempt to 
resolve the matter directly between themselves.99 If they are unable to 
resolve the matter, they must refer the matter to the ombud with 
jurisdiction for resolution in accordance with the National Credit Act or (if 
the credit provider concerned is a financial institution and a participant in a 
recognised scheme as defined in the Financial Services Ombud Schemes 
Act) in terms of the Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act.100 In other 
cases, they are required to apply to either a consumer court for resolution 
in accordance with the National Credit Act and any provincial legislation 
establishing that consumer court. They can also apply to an alternative 
dispute resolution agent for resolution by conciliation, mediation or 
arbitration.101 
                                            
96 Rule 21(1) of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal. 
97 Rule 22 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal. 
98 Rule 21(4) of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal. 
99 Section 134(4)(a) of the National Credit Act. 
100 Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act 37 of 2004. 
101 Section 134(4)(b) of the National Credit Act. 
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In the case of the CCMA, in relation to individual unfair labour practices 
and unfair dismissals the LRA permits the implementation of a process 
known as "con-arb" (conciliation-arbitration). Con-arb is a speedier one-
stop process of conciliation and arbitration which allows for conciliation 
and arbitration to take place as a continuous process on the same day, if 
required.102 
4.4  Independence and impartiality of adjudication institutions 
The independence and impartiality of the institutions or forums are 
ensured, as they were created either as independent institutions that are 
autonomous of the administrative and/or delivery institutions; or as courts 
of law.103 The Competition Tribunal is able to effectively perform its 
obligations due to its status and nature and the independence of its 
members. The Tribunal is a juristic person and a Tribunal of record.104 The 
President of the Republic appoints ten persons as members of the 
Tribunal. Tribunal members are appointed on the recommendation of the 
Minister of Trade and Industry, from among persons nominated by the 
Minister, either on the Minister's initiative or in response to a public call for 
nominations.105 
In addition, a person cannot be a member of the Competition Tribunal if he 
or she is an office-bearer of a party, movement, organisation or body of a 
partisan political nature. A person is also disqualified from membership if 
he or she is an un-rehabilitated insolvent; is subject to an order of a 
competent court holding that person to be mentally unfit or disordered; or 
has been convicted of an offence committed after the Constitution of 1993 
took effect and sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine.106 
                                            
102 Section 191 of the LRA. 
103 The CCMA is independent of employees / trade unions and employers / employers' 
organisations; while the Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal are 
independent of business. The Competition Appeal Court has the status of a High 
Court. 
104 Section 26(1) of the Competition Act. 
105 Section 26(2) of the Competition Act. Two members (the Chairperson and one other 
member) are full-time executive members of the Tribunal, while eight (including the 
deputy chairperson) are part-time non-executive members. These members 
constitute the pool from which the chairperson appoints adjudicative panels 
comprising three members (see Competition Tribunal 2015 
http://www.comptrib.co.za/about /members/). 
106 Section 28 of the Competition Act. 
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The conditions of appointment;107 the discipline and termination of service 
of Competition Tribunal members;108 as well as the operational 
arrangements of the Tribunal (such as funding;109 human resource and 
administrative support;110 management;111 governance, oversight and 
supervision;112 and accountability and reporting113) also foster its 
                                            
107 The Chairperson and each other member of the Competition Tribunal are appointed 
for five years, although the President may re-appoint a member of the Competition 
Tribunal at the expiry of that member's term of office. However, no person may be 
appointed to the office of the Chairperson of the Tribunal for more than two 
consecutive terms (s 29 of the Competition Act). If a member is still considering a 
matter before the Tribunal on the expiry of his or her term, the member can continue 
to act as a member in respect of that matter only (s 33 of the Competition Act). The 
Minister of Trade and Industry determines the remuneration, allowances, and other 
benefits of the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson and other members of the 
Competition Tribunal (in consultation with the Minister of Finance) (s 34(1) of the 
Competition Act). The Minister also determines other conditions of appointment of 
members of the Competition Tribunal. The Minister cannot reduce a member's 
salary, allowances or benefits during his or her term of office once these are 
determined.  
108 The Chairperson can resign from the Competition Tribunal; or resign as the 
Chairperson but remain as a member of the Tribunal if he or she gives one month's 
written notice to the Minister. Any other member of the Tribunal can resign by giving 
at least one month's written notice to the Minister (ss 29(3) and (4) of the 
Competition Act). The President can remove the Chairperson or another member of 
the Competition Tribunal from office (on the recommendation of the Minister) if that 
person becomes an office-bearer of a party, movement, organisation or body of a 
partisan political nature. The Chairperson or member can also be removed if the 
person becomes an un-rehabilitated insolvent; becomes subject to an order of a 
competent court holding him or her to be mentally unfit or disordered; or is convicted 
of an offence committed after the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 
1993 took effect, and is sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine (s 
29(5)(a) of the Competition Act). The President can also remove the Chairperson or 
a member of the Competition Tribunal from office (on the recommendation of the 
Minister) for serious misconduct, permanent incapacity, or for engaging in an activity 
that may undermine the integrity of the Tribunal (s 29(5)(b) of the Competition Act). 
109 The Competition Tribunal is financed from money appropriated by Parliament for the 
Tribunal; fees payable to the Tribunal in terms of the Act; income derived by the 
Tribunal from its investment and deposit of surplus money; and money received from 
any other source (s 40(1) read with s 42 of the Competition Act).  
110 The Chairperson of the Tribunal appoints staff, or contracts with other persons, to 
assist the Competition Tribunal in carrying out its functions; and determines the 
remuneration, allowances, benefits, and other terms and conditions of appointment 
of a member of the staff (in consultation with the Minister and the Minister of 
Finance) (s 35 of the Competition Act). 
111 The Chairperson is responsible for managing the caseload of the Competition 
Tribunal, and assigns each matter referred to the Tribunal to a panel composed of 
any three members of the Tribunal (s 31(1) of the Competition Act). 
112 Governance, oversight and supervision are undertaken by the National Assembly as 
the Minister of Trade and Industry is required to table in the National Assembly the 
annual report of the Tribunal (and Commission) submitted to him or her (s 41(1) and 
(2) read with s 42 of the Competition Act). 
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independence and impartiality. These enable the Tribunal and its 
members to function without any undue interference and influence.  
The institutional framework, status and composition of the National 
Consumer Tribunal indicate the desire for it to resolve consumer disputes 
independently, impartially and efficiently. The Tribunal has 11 members 
appointed by the President of the Republic on a full- or part-time basis.114 
A member of the Tribunal serves for a term of five years, although he or 
she may be reappointed at the expiry of his or her term of office.115 
However, a person cannot be appointed as Chairperson of the Tribunal for 
more than two consecutive terms. 
A person cannot be a member of the Tribunal if he or she is an office-
bearer of any party, movement, organisation or body of a partisan political 
nature.116 This will also be the case if the person acquires a direct or 
indirect financial interest in a registrant with the National Credit Regulator 
personally or through a spouse, partner or associate. A person who 
acquires an interest in a business or enterprise, which may conflict or 
interfere with the proper performance of his or her duties, also cannot be 
appointed. Other situations which bar a person from becoming a member 
of the National Consumer Tribunal include if the person is an un-
rehabilitated insolvent or becomes insolvent and the insolvency results in 
the sequestration of that person's estate; if the person is removed from an 
office of trust on account of misconduct in respect of fraud or the 
misappropriation of money; if the person is subject to an order of a 
competent court holding that person to be mentally unfit or disordered; if 
the person is convicted in the Republic or elsewhere of theft, fraud, forgery 
                                                                                                                       
113 The Competition Tribunal (together with the Competition Commission) is listed as a 
national public entity in Schedule 3A of the PFMA. The Chairperson of the Tribunal 
is the accounting authority of the Competition Tribunal for the purposes of the PFMA 
(s 40(7) read with s 42 of the Competition Act). Each year, the Chairperson submits 
to the Minister a statement of the Competition Tribunal's estimated income and 
expenditure, and requested appropriation from Parliament, in respect of the next 
financial year (s 40(3) read with s 42 of the Competition Act). Within six months after 
the end of each financial year, the Chairperson is required to prepare financial 
statements in accordance with established accounting practice, principles and 
procedures, comprising a statement reflecting, with suitable and sufficient 
particulars, the income and expenditure of the Competition Tribunal during the 
preceding financial year; and a balance sheet showing the state of its assets, 
liabilities and financial position as at the end of that financial year. The Competition 
Tribunal's financial records are audited each year by the Auditor General (ss 40(9) 
and (10) read with s 42 of the Competition Act). 
114 Section 26(2) of the National Credit Act. 
115 Section 29(2) of the National Credit Act. 
116 Section 26(4) read with s 20(2) of the National Credit Act. 
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or uttering a forged document, perjury, an offence under the Prevention 
and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act;117 or an offence under the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act;118 or an offence involving dishonesty; or 
is convicted of any other offence and sentenced to imprisonment without 
the option of a fine. 
The conditions of employment of Tribunal members;119 their discipline and 
the termination of their service;120 and the operational arrangements of the 
Tribunal (including funding;121 human resource and administrative 
support;122 managerial framework;123 governance, oversight and 
supervision;124 and accountability and reporting125) also foster its 
independence and impartiality. 
                                            
117 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
118 Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001. 
119 The National Credit Act states that during the term of office of a member of the 
Tribunal, the member's salary, allowances or benefits may not be reduced (s 34 of 
the National Credit Act). 
120 The Chairperson may resign from the Tribunal, or resign as Chairperson but remain 
as a member of the Tribunal if he or she gives the Minister one month's written 
notice (s 29(3) of the National Credit Act). A member of the Tribunal other than the 
Chairperson may resign by giving at least one month's written notice to the Minister 
(s 29(4) of the National Credit Act). The President removes the Chairperson or any 
other member of the Tribunal from office on the recommendation of the Minister if he 
or she is disqualified from being a member of the Tribunal (s 29(5)(a) read with s 
20(2) of the National Credit Act). In addition, the President can also remove the 
Chairperson or a member of the Tribunal from office for serious misconduct; 
permanent incapacity, or engaging in any activity that may undermine the integrity of 
the Tribunal (s 29(5)(a) of the National Credit Act). 
121 The National Consumer Tribunal is financed from funds appropriated by Parliament, 
any fees payable in terms of the Act, income derived from their respective 
investment and deposit of surplus funds, and other funds accruing from any source 
(s 35 of the National Credit Act). 
122 The registry of the Tribunal (which is led by the Registrar) provides administrative 
support and secretarial functions to the Chairperson and CEO – see National 
Consumer Tribunal Annual Report 2013-2014. 
123 The head of the Tribunal is the Chairperson, who is responsible for managing the 
caseload of the Tribunal. The Deputy Chairperson performs the functions of 
Chairperson in his or her absence (s 31(1) of the National Credit Act). 
124 Governance, oversight and supervision of the National Consumer Tribunal are 
undertaken by Parliament. Every five years the Minister is required to conduct an 
audit review of the exercise of the functions and powers of the National Consumer 
Tribunal. The Minister also receives an annual report from the National Consumer 
Tribunal on its activities, as required by the PFMA. When the Minister conducts an 
audit review of the exercise of the functions and powers of the National Consumer 
Tribunal or receives an annual report on the Tribunal's activities, he or she forwards 
a copy of the report to the Premier of each province. He or she also tables it in 
Parliament as soon as practicable (s 36 of the National Credit Act). 
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The CCMA was established as an institution that is independent of the 
State, any political party, trade union, employer, employers' organisation, 
federation of trade unions or federation of employers' organisations.126 The 
CCMA's independence and impartiality is promoted through the 
appointment and conditions of service of members;127 its funding;128 
                                                                                                                       
125 The National Consumer Tribunal (and the National Credit Regulator) must each 
report to the Minister annually on its activities, as required by the PFMA (s 36 of the 
National Credit Act). 
126 Section 113 of the LRA. 
127 The CCMA is governed by a Governing Body (s 116(1) of the LRA). The Governing 
Body consists of a chairperson and nine other members, each nominated by 
NEDLAC and appointed by the Minister of Labour; and the Director of the CCMA 
(who has non-voting power). The chairperson, who is an independent person, is 
nominated by NEDLAC; three members of the Governing Body are nominated by 
NEDLAC to represent organised labour; three members of the Governing Body are 
nominated by NEDLAC to represent organised business; and three members of the 
Governing Body are nominated by NEDLAC to represent the State. The Members of 
the Governing Body are appointed for a period of three years (s 116(2) of the LRA). 
The Governing Body appoints the Director of the CCMA (s 118(1) of the LRA). The 
Director is required to perform the functions that are conferred on him/her by or in 
terms of the LRA or by any other law; to perform functions that are delegated to the 
Director by the Governing Body; to manage and direct the activities of the 
Commission; and to supervise the Commission's staff (s 118(2) of the LRA). The 
Governing Body determines the Director's remuneration, allowances and any other 
terms and conditions of appointment not contained in Schedule 3 of the LRA (s 
118(3) of the LRA). A person appointed as the Director of the CCMA automatically 
holds the office of a Senior Commissioner. However, only the requirement that the 
Governing Body must prepare a code of conduct for the Commissioners and ensure 
that they comply with the code of conduct in performing their functions in s 117 
applies to the Director (s 118(4) of the LRA). The Director, in consultation with the 
Governing Body, may delegate any of the functions of his or her office to a 
Commissioner, except the functions mentioned in ss 120 and 138(8) (s 118(6) of the 
LRA). The Governing Body appoints as Commissioners as many adequately 
qualified persons as it considers necessary to perform the functions of 
Commissioners by or in terms of the LRA or any other law (s 117(1) of the LRA). The 
Governing Body appoints each Commissioner on either a full-time or a part-time 
basis; and to be either a Commissioner or a Senior Commissioner. The Governing 
Body appoints each Commissioner for a fixed term determined by it at the time of 
appointment. The Governing Body may appoint a Commissioner, who is not a Senior 
Commissioner, for a probationary period. When making appointments, the 
Governing Body must have due regard to the need to constitute a Commission that 
is independent and competent and representative in respect of race and gender (s 
117(2) of the LRA). The Governing Body determines the Commissioners' 
remuneration, allowances and any other terms and conditions of appointment not 
contained in the LRA (s 117(4) of the LRA). The Governing Body is required to 
prepare a code of conduct for Commissioners and ensure that they comply with the 
code of conduct in performing their functions (s 117(6) of the LRA). A Commissioner 
may resign by giving written notice to the governing body (s 117(5) of the LRA). The 
Governing Body may remove a Commissioner from office for serious misconduct; 
incapacity; or a material violation of the Commission's code of conduct (s 117(7) of 
the LRA). Also see Maepe v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
2008 29 ILJ 2189 (LAC). 
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human resource and administrative support;129 managerial framework;130 
governance, oversight and supervision;131 and accountability and 
reporting.132 These attributes enable the CCMA to effectively undertake its 
objectives; and to eliminate any undue influence in its activities so that it 
can function independently and impartially. 
4.5  Expertise of adjudication institutions 
The statutes establishing comparative South African social security 
institutions promote the effectiveness of the institutions by requiring that 
only suitably qualified persons are appointed as members. This is done by 
stipulating minimum academic qualifications and relevant professional and 
other experience. As examples, the Chairperson and other members of 
the Competition Tribunal are required to comprise sufficient persons with 
legal training and experience to satisfy the requirements of the Act.133 
They are also required to have suitable qualifications and experience in 
                                                                                                                       
128 The CCMA is funded through moneys that the Minister of Labour (with the 
agreement of the Minister of Finance) allocates from public funds; moneys that 
Parliament appropriates to it; fees payable to the CCMA; grants, donations and 
bequests made to it; and income earned on the surplus moneys deposited or 
invested (s 122 of the LRA). 
129 The CCMA is composed of a Governing Body, the Director and Commissioners (ss 
117, 118 and 119 of the LRA). In addition, the Director appoints staff of the CCMA 
after consulting the Governing Body. The Governing Body determines the 
remuneration and allowances and any other terms and conditions of appointment of 
staff members (s 120 of the LRA).  
130 The CCMA is headed by the Director, who manages and directs its activities and 
supervises the staff (s 118(2) of the LRA).  
131 Governance, oversight and supervision of the CCMA are undertaken by a Governing 
Body as the supreme policy-making body responsible for the policy-making of the 
CCMA (s 116 of the LRA). 
132 The CCMA is listed in Schedule 3A of the PFMA as a national public entity. This 
implies the autonomous financial accountability of the CCMA. Financial 
accountability and reporting for the CCMA are undertaken by the Director. In each 
financial year, the CCMA is required to submit to the Minister a statement of the 
Commission's estimated income and expenditure, and requested appropriation from 
Parliament, for the following financial year (s 122(3) of the LRA). In addition, the 
CCMA is required to provide the Minister of Labour with a report concerning its 
activities and the financial position during the previous financial year. The Minister 
tables the annual report in Parliament within 14 days of receiving it from the CCMA. 
However, if Parliament is not in session at that time, the Minister tables the report 
within 14 days of the beginning of the next session of Parliament (Item 9(1) and (2) 
of Schedule 4 of the LRA). 
133 Section 28(1) of the Competition Act. 
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economics, law, commerce, industry or public affairs and to be committed 
to the purposes and principles of the Competition Act.134 
The members of the National Consumer Tribunal are also required to 
comprise sufficient persons with legal training and experience to satisfy 
the requirements of the Act.135 A member is required to have suitable 
qualifications and experience in economics, law, commerce, industry or 
consumer affairs, and to be committed to the purposes of the Act.136 
A person who is appointed as Director of the CCMA must be a person who 
is skilled and experienced in labour relations and dispute resolution; and 
has not been convicted of any offence involving dishonesty.137 
5 Conclusions 
Adjudication institutions or forums in comparative South African non-social 
security jurisdictions present many lessons for the reform of the social 
security adjudication framework. The multi-tiered and complementary 
nature of these dispute resolution institutions, their status and procedures 
guarantee their effectiveness in resolving disputes. They are able to 
undertake sequential and complementary review and appeal procedures, 
which allows for the resolution of disputes at an appropriate level and 
ensures the independence of the appeal institution from the administration 
that reviewed the initial complaint. 
Attempts to make the institutions accessible are not always appropriately 
made. Some of the institutions convene in as many places as are 
necessary, while others have a single centrally located presence. 
However, accessibility is facilitated by appropriate dispute lodgement 
procedures and time limits. The wide scope of possible claimants also 
ensures greater accessibility to the institutions. 
The scope of the jurisdiction and of the powers of these institutions are 
also fairly wide, although limited to matters falling within the purview of the 
enabling statute. The wide scope of the jurisdiction and the powers 
enables the institutions to provide a wide range of remedies, such as 
                                            
134 They must also be citizens of South Africa, ordinarily resident in the country (s 28(2) 
of the Competition Act). 
135 Section 28(1) of the National Credit Act. 
136 Section 28(2) of the National Credit Act. Current members come from diverse 
backgrounds including law, academia, business, government and non-governmental 
organisations (see Woker Date Unknown http://tinyurl.com/jfm3h9u). 
137 Section 118(1) of the LRA. 
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making an order which any court of law may make, providing interim relief 
and making cost orders. Some of the institutions that are not courts of law 
also have the powers to enforce their decisions. 
The procedures of the adjudication institutions promote the resolution of 
disputes quickly and fairly. This is achieved by empowering them to 
determine adjudication procedures, which gives scope for the adoption of 
flexible procedures. Procedural fairness is further promoted through the 
participation of parties in the resolution of disputes in person or through a 
representative. 
The independence and impartiality of the institutions or forums are 
ensured, as they were created either as independent institutions that are 
autonomous of the administrative or delivery institutions, or as courts of 
law. The independence and impartiality of the institutions are fostered 
through the conditions of appointment; the discipline and termination of the 
service of members, as well as their operational arrangements (such as 
funding; human resource and administrative support; management; 
governance, oversight and supervision; and accountability and reporting). 
The effectiveness of comparative South African institutions is further 
promoted by requiring that only suitably qualified persons are appointed as 
members. This is done by the stipulation of minimum academic 
qualifications and relevant professional and other experience. This is in 
contrast with the position in some current social security dispute resolution 
forums that do not state such requirements.138 
Dispute resolution institutions and procedures in the labour relations, 
competition and consumer protection spheres provide examples of 
systems established to resolve disputes in an efficient and effective 
manner. They can thus be considered as realising the rights to access to 
justice and to just administrative action for their users, thereby presenting 
useful guidelines for the reform of the current social security dispute 
resolution framework. 
                                            
138 As examples, the Regulations to the Social Assistance Act stipulate minimum 
qualifications and experience requirements for the members of the Independent 
Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals panel who are legal practitioners and medical 
practitioners. The Regulations to the Road Accident Fund Act also state minimum 
qualifications and experience requirements for the medical practitioners that make 
up the Appeal Tribunal. The Pension Funds Act also states minimum qualifications 
and experience requirements for a person to be appointed as an (Acting) Adjudicator 
(see Regs 6-8 in GN R746 in GG 34618 of 19 September 2011; Reg 3(8) in GN 769 
in GG 31249 of 21 July 2008; and s 30C of the Pension Funds Act). 
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6 Recommendations 
At present, various social security institutions are responsible for the 
administration of particular risks and for the resolution of disputes, since 
there is no single overall social security administrative institution.139 
Therefore, improving the system requires properly functioning internal 
review or revision frameworks within each institution. The establishment of 
well-structured and properly-aligned internal review frameworks will lessen 
the workload of the appeal institution(s) and will also enhance decision-
making by the institution.140 
The Social Assistance Act provides for a senior official to reconsider a 
decision by the South African Social Security Agency.141 Provision must 
be made for officials designated to undertake reconsiderations to be 
appropriately qualified and to be trained if necessary. The Agency should 
be empowered to condone the late lodgement of applications for 
reconsideration; and reconsiderations should be conducted at the level of 
the SASSA District Office to promote accessibility (geographical and 
physical). 
In relation to COIDA, the "Compensation Court" should undertake the 
review of the decisions of the Compensation Fund. The presiding officer 
and assessors should be sufficiently qualified to review such decisions. 
The scope of jurisdiction of the Compensation Court should be wide, as it 
should be able to review any decision of the Director-
General/Compensation Commissioner. Its powers must also be extensive 
in order that it may be able to confirm, vary or set aside the original 
decision and replace it. 
A framework for the review or reconsideration of ODMWA compensation 
claim decisions must be established, possibly by extending the scope of 
jurisdiction of the Reviewing Authority. The system for the review of 
disputes relating to the certification of an occupational disease must also 
                                            
139 As announced in the State of the Nation Address2007, the government is planning a 
National Social Security System in order to address South Africa's social security 
challenges (see Mbeki 2007 http://www.gov.za/node/538254; and National Treasury 
Social Security and Retirement Reform). The National Social Security System will 
streamline the administration of social security, since the administration of the 
different risks will be undertaken by a single institution. This implies that the review 
or reconsideration of decisions will also be carried out by a single institution. 
140 See Olivier, Govindjee and Nyenti Project to Set Up Internal Remedy Units 129. 
141 An example can be found in the Social Assistance Act, which empowers the SASSA 
to reconsider its decision (s 18(1) of the Social Assistance Act). 
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be reformed. The Reviewing Authority should be designated as the 
internal review or reconsideration forum. Multiple dispute lodgement 
mechanisms must be provided (such as by hand, post, fax or electronic 
mail). In addition, the Reviewing Authority should also have the power to 
condone applications which are submitted late, where good cause is 
shown. The Reviewing Authority should have the power to review any 
finding of the Certification Committee and the Compensation 
Commissioner on its own, and be able to confirm, vary or rescind the 
decisions. The certification of diseases and the review of decisions should 
be undertaken in as many locations as practically possible, and the 
certification procedure must also be expedited. 
Under the Unemployment Insurance Act, the Regional Appeals 
Committees of the UIF Board are geographically or physically distributed 
around the Republic. Therefore they offer a more accessible option (than 
the National Appeals Committee) for persons unhappy with decisions of 
the Fund to review the decision. In addition, members of the Regional 
Appeals Committees could be considered to be more senior in rank than 
the original decision-makers at the Unemployment Insurance Fund. 
Suitably qualified or trained persons should thus be appointed to 
undertake the review or reconsideration of Unemployment Insurance Fund 
decisions.  
No proper mechanism for the internal Road Accident Fund review or 
reconsideration of its decision has been established in the Road Accident 
Fund Act. This means that there should be either the creation of an 
internal framework for the Road Accident Fund to review or reconsider its 
decisions, or the designation of the Appeal Tribunal appointed by the 
Registrar of the HPCSA as the internal review forum for the Fund. Such 
proposals were made by the Road Accident Fund Commission in 2002, 
which stated that the Road Accident Fund should establish its own internal 
review mechanism or body capable of monitoring decisions on benefits 
and initiating immediate reconsideration of such decisions where there is 
an indication or notification by a claimant of a dispute.142 Although the 
Commission also proposed a two-tiered (external) appeals system,143 it is 
hereby recommended that only an internal review mechanism should be 
developed within the Road Accident Fund. 
                                            
142 See RAF Commission Report XLIV. 
143 RAF Commission Report 782. The proposal consisted of a first stage appeal to a 
Benefits Review Panel and thereafter an appeal to a Benefits Appeal Tribunal.  
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One of the functions of the Council for Medical Schemes in terms of the 
Medical Schemes Act is to investigate complaints and settle disputes in 
relation to the affairs of medical schemes as provided for in the Medical 
Schemes Act. It should thus be the designated internal dispute resolution 
forum. 
The Pension Funds Act requires pension funds to reconsider decisions 
when a member of the fund lodges an application for reconsideration. If a 
complainant is not satisfied with the reply of the fund or the employer, or if 
the fund or the employer fails to reply within 30 days of the receipt of the 
complaint, the complainant may lodge the complaint with the Office of the 
Pension Funds Adjudicator.144 
In addition to the reform of internal review mechanisms, a uniform, 
external and independent social security appeal institution must also be 
created to hear appeals emanating from reviewed or reconsidered 
decisions on the basis of law and fairness. A Social Security Appeals 
Tribunal is proposed, which will serve as the new highest level of non-
judicial appeal in social security matters. It will replace all existing appeal 
institutions, such as the Independent Tribunal for Social Assistance 
Appeals, the National Appeals Committee of the Unemployment Insurance 
Fund Board, the Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal and the Office of 
the Pension Funds Adjudicator. A further right to review by the High Court 
should be provided. 
This reformed framework would ensure the multi-tiered and 
complementary resolution of disputes, with sequential review and appeal 
procedures, which would allow for the resolution of disputes at an 
appropriate level. It would also ensure the independence of the appeal 
institution from the administration that reviewed the initial complaint.  
                                            
144 Section 30A of the Pension Funds Act. 
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